Personal epistemologies and social representations : And how they meet in people’s conceptions of the origin of human species by Pirttilä-Backman, Anna-Maija et al.
1 
 
Anna-Maija Pirttilä-Backman, Salla Ahola & Inari Sakki 
Personal epistemologies and social representations – and how they meet in 
people’s conceptions of the origin of human species1 
Abstract 
This chapter examines human thinking from two different perspectives: personal epistemologies 
and social representations. We first present a developmental model of personal epistemologies, that 
is, individuals’ assumptions of the nature of knowledge and justification of knowledge claims. After 
that we introduce the theory of social representations – how people as groups form everyday 
theories of issues that are interesting, important or new to them. The specific focus of this chapter is 
on how Finnish people form everyday understandings of the human species within the frameworks 
of evolution theory and creation story – both having a relatively strong position within the Finnish 
educational system and culture. People’s understanding of the origins of human beings are analysed 
from the perspectives of personal epistemologies and social representations. The results show that 
knowledge is polymorphic and social subjects may use contrasting modes of reasoning depending 
on the context and their needs. We suggest that the concept of cognitive polyphasia helps 
understand the use of different, sometimes contradictory explanatory models in people’s everyday 
thinking of human species. We conclude by discussing the potential of combining personal 
epistemologies and social representations in the study of human thinking.  
 
Whose claims about climate change should one believe? What is the most effective way to defend 
against economic crises? Which is healthier, butter or margarine? Newspapers and magazines write 
about these kinds of topics on a regular basis, they are disputed in current affairs and argued in peer 
groups, homes, workplaces and more widely on the internet. How do individuals, groups and 
societies react and get along amidst contradictory and changing information? Does new research 
provide adequate grounds for understanding these issues? Or is the information flow a threat under 
which people feel powerless, become indifferent and withdraw themselves? 
What conceptions of knowledge do people have and how do they justify their knowledge claims 
and how do these change? In this chapter we present one of the better-known developmental models 
of these issues, namely that of Karen Kitchener (1978) and Patricia King (1977), constructed in the 
1970s in their doctoral dissertations. Initially they used the title Reflective Judgment Model. They 
adopted the concept from the century-old texts of John Dewey, in which he deliberated on juridical 
decision making: the decisions were important, they had important practical consequences for those 
concerned, and they should not be made arbitrarily. King (1977) and Kitchener (1978) remarked 
that Dewey did not clarify how the decisions should be made; however, he talked about the 
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selection of the circumstances that should be taken into account and the need to evaluate the validity 
and applicability of evidence in the situation at hand – about reflective judgment. In Kitchener’s and 
King’s terminology, reflective judgment refers to the most developed way to deal with problems, to 
which there is no single and unequivocally correct solution. Their developmental model describes 
the move towards this highest stage. 
Since then, the term "personal epistemologies" has been introduced as a distinction to the 
epistemologies presented by professional philosophies (see e.g. Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Pintrich, 
2002). The term also suits the model of Kitchener and King well, because it describes and explains 
the development of assumptions of what knowledge is and the ways how knowledge claims are 
justified. In this chapter, we first discuss personal epistemologies and their manifestations among 
adults, as well as their practical significance and relationship to wisdom research. After that, we 
shift the perspective onto groups and communities and their formation of shared everyday 
knowledge, i.e. social representations. Finally, we make an excursion to people’s understanding of 
the origins of human beings and analyse these conceptions from the perspectives of personal 
epistemologies and social representations. This example comes from Finnish interviews, from a 
North European country with highly educated population.  
 
The development of personal epistemologies 
The questions raised at the beginning of this chapter were of the type that also concerned Kitchener 
and King in the 1970s. They wanted to find out how people deal with ill-structured (called also 
wicked) problems that do not have one obvious solution. For the most part, Kitchener’s and King's 
research was based on the pioneering work of William Perry (1970) on what he called the 
intellectual and ethical development of Harvard students (see Seppälä, Kallio & Lindblom-Ylänne, 
chapter 3, this volume).                                                                                                                                              
 
The key question of Kitchener's and King's dissertations was whether thinking concerning 
knowledge would actually develop further than what Perry described in his model at stages 1-6 (see 
Seppälä et al., this volume). Together they developed a method for studying personal 
epistemologies. Kitchener's special research question was to find out how personal epistemologies 
differ from verbal reasoning and fluency, while King focused on differences from logical reasoning. 
According to their results, the evolution of personal epistemologies could not be reduced to either 
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logical reasoning or verbal reasoning or fluency, even though some connections between them were 
found.  
Perry's (1970) interview method, starting from questions that were topical to the interviewees, had 
produced a good description of the personal epistemologies up to a certain point, as the questions 
related to knowledge were topical to the students at the beginning and intermediate stages of their 
studies. However, at the end of the studies, questions related to personal life choices were more 
pressing than issues related to knowing, and Perry’s last positions reflected this. Kitchener and King 
specifically asked whether there was epistemic development after the knowing-related positions 
Perry had described. They ended up presenting their interviewees with dilemmas that were 
constructed of contradictory claims. They sought their interviewees’ standpoints to the dilemmas 
and how they justified their views. In this way, the researchers were able to concentrate on 
knowing-related issues. Their final series included dilemmas covering questions in four different 
areas of life (construction of the Egyptian pyramids, the objectivity of news reporting, the effect of 
food additives on health, and the origin of the human species). In the dilemmas, both of the 
contrasting standpoints were presented as having previously been supported, for example, in the 
discussion of food additives like this:  
“There have been frequent reports about the relationship between chemicals that are 
added to foods and the safety of these foods. Some studies indicate that such 
chemicals can cause cancer, making these foods unsafe to eat. Other studies, however, 
show that chemical additives are not harmful, and actually make the foods containing 
them more safe to eat.” (King & Kitchener, 1994, p. 260) 
After the presentation of each dilemma, the interviewees were asked for their standpoints, followed 
by a number of more detailed and deepening questions such as how they ended up adopting this 
position and could they ever think differently. If an interviewee said that s/he was unable to take a 
stand, s/he was asked why this was not possible and whether s/he could ever take a stand on the 
matter and if so, under what conditions. Further clarifications were requested if an interviewee used 
words like "theory" or "proof" without further characterisation. The interviewees in King’s and 
Kitchener's PhD dissertations were junior high school students and graduate and postgraduate 
students in liberal arts. 
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Kitchener and King presented a seven-stage developmental model of assumptions of knowledge and 
justifications of knowledge claims (see Table 1). 
  TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Understandings of knowledge evolve from absolutistic, concrete understanding towards conceiving 
knowledge as hypothetical constructions. Critical milestones in this development are the gradually 
deepening understanding of uncertainty and contextuality as well as the realisation of the possibility 
to compare different knowledge claims on the basis of negotiable and justified criteria.   
Kitchener's and King's work belongs to the group of cognitive-developmental models and theories. 
Its roots can be found in the theories of Piaget (see Seppälä et al., this volume), Lawrence Kohlberg 
(see Juujärvi & Helkama, as well as Mäkiniemi & Vainio, chapters 5 and 6, this volume) and 
William Perry (see Seppälä et al., this volume). More specifically, it belongs to the subgroup of 
complex stage models as defined by James Rest (1979). In these models the conceptions and 
justifications are reorganised during each new stage relative to the previous one. The changes are 
qualitative transformations in the assumptions and justifications of knowledge, not just linear 
increases or decreases in some assumptions. Furthermore, it is assumed and also well documented 
that people’s thinking and arguing can have features not only from one stage, but also from several 
successive stages at the same time.2 Typically, the developmental models of personal 
epistemologies have presented a similar line of development as Kitchener’s and King’s model, 
though there is variation in the number of stages or levels across models (see, e.g., Hofer, 2016). 
A number of Finnish studies that have used Kitchener’s and King's method (e.g., Kajanne, 2003; 
Pirttilä-Backman, 1993; Pirttilä-Backman & Kajanne, 2001) have convincingly demonstrated the 
connection between educational levels and also educational fields and such factors as diversity of 
living environments, work experience and role-playing opportunities – and the developmental 
stages of personal epistemologies. Pirttilä-Backman (1993) has also demonstrated that the model is 
not bound to any single theory of truth. Thoughts reflecting critical realism, pragmatism, and 
relativism can be categorised into the highest stage as long as they are sufficiently well-founded. 
(For further critical analysis of assumptions in the adult developmental theories, see Tuominen & 
Kallio, chapter 13, this volume.) 
In the aforementioned Finnish studies (e.g., Pirttilä-Backman, 1993), the interviewees argued in 
ways that reflected mostly the same stages regardless of the subject matter of the dilemma. This 
means that the assumptions about knowledge were similar regardless of the substance of the 
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question. Furthermore, the interviewees’ own field (i.e. engineering, medicine or social sciences) 
did not have a differentiating effect on the argumentation across dilemmas. Also, King’s and 
Kitchener’s (2004) respondents argued rather similarly about various dilemmas, although the 
consistency in the US studies has been weaker than in the aforementioned systematically 
heterogeneous Finnish sample (which consisted of interviewees representing several fields, and 
both students and those already in working life). 
More recently however, researchers have increasingly started to consider that people’s conceptions 
of knowledge could differ depending on the domain, context, academic discipline, school subject, 
or different areas of life (Greene, Sandoval & Bråten, 2016; Hofer, 2006; Muis, Bendixen & Haerle, 
2006; Pintrich, 2002). Indeed, the current models are increasingly taking such domain-specific and 
contextual aspects of knowledge-related thinking into account (Greene et al., 2016).  
 
The significance of personal epistemologies in everyday life  
What is the role of personal epistemologies in practice? Several studies have found that they are 
associated with recognising different views, argumentation and drawing conclusions. More 
specifically, they are related, for example, to the ability to recognise contrasting views and to 
evaluate them (Mason & Boscolo, 2004), skills of argumentation on climate change and genetically 
modified food (Mason & Scirica, 2006), the ability to recognise reasoning fallacies (Weinstock, 
Neuman & Glassner, 2006), as well as views on food additives (Kajanne, 2003) and evolution 
acceptance (Borgerding, Deniz & Anderson, 2017). Recently Staerklé and Green (2014) suggested 
that personal epistemologies could also contribute to defining intergroup relations. 
Other people’s personal epistemologies can also have a significant role in making important 
decisions that concern a particular individual, for example, in contexts such as law (Weinstock, 
2016) or medicine (Eastwood et al., 2017). Anyone who ends up on trial or in an equivalent 
situation, where other people give verdicts or make other important decisions, would probably hope 
that the decision-makers have personal epistemologies that are as advanced as possible. Less ideal 
would be that important decisions are made by people who do not want to go to any further effort 
after finding a solution that seems plausible or who think it is not worthwhile to deliberate and to 
scrutinise different opinions that seem like knowledge but are not finally backed up by any proper 
evidence (Weinstock & Cronin, 2003). Similar concerns have been raised recently in discussions 
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about the so-called post-truth age, and unfortunately, there are many recent examples particularly 
from public decision-making in which this ideal has not been met. 
 
Social representations: Everyday, common-sense theories of groups  
When an individual knows something, personal epistemologies provide the framework to it, even 
though people seldom think about these frames consciously. Knowledge can mean an absolute 
truth, an opinion or a well-formulated hypothetical construction to a person. People form their own 
personal epistemologies and personal standpoints in social interaction, and they also form ideas and 
build knowledge as groups and communities.  
The theory of social representations (SRT) is the most notable approach from which to study groups 
and communities’ shared understandings. The seminal work in the field, Serge Moscovici’s 
(1961/2008) dissertation La psychanalyse, son image et son public is about how psychoanalysis 
spread to French society – how it was addressed in newspapers representing various ideological 
trends and how it was rooted in French daily conversations. The liberal, the communist and the 
catholic press – the French opinion leaders at that time – presented and discussed psychoanalysis 
from their own premises, raised and faded out themes according to their own interests, and adjusted 
concepts and presented them in the light of their own starting points. Moscovici suggested that new 
things are made familiar and understandable through two processes. In anchoring, something new 
and unknown is associated with already known phenomena and located in existing conceptual 
matrixes. For example, a psychoanalytic therapy session is seen as a catholic confession, whereby it 
becomes understandable. The second process is objectification, in which an abstract case gets 
almost a concrete manifestation. For example, when god is perceived to be a father, the experience 
is almost physically touchable. 
Durkheim’s concept of collective representations provided one theoretical point of reference to the 
theory of social representations: while Durkheim’s collective representations are permanent and 
unchanging, explanatory and given, social representations are dynamic and something to be 
explained (Moscovici, 1981). Also, the impact of Piaget on Moscovici’s work was profound. 
Although Moscovici abandoned Piaget’s description of human development as being an 
evolutionary, linear process, he retained the idea of cooperative interaction in the development of 
knowledge as well as the creative aspect of representation, meaning that in gaining new knowledge, 
children must reinvent the world since they often have no familiar foundations for those aspects of 
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their environment that they are confronting for the first time (Sakki, Menard & Pirttilä-Backman, 
2017; Jovchelovich, 2007).  
According to Moscovici (1973, p. xiii), social representations are “systems of values, ideas and 
practices with a twofold function; first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to orient 
themselves in their material and social world and to master it; secondly, to enable communication to 
take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange 
and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their 
individual and group history.” These representations are the counterparts of our society to myths 
and belief systems of traditional communities. They are not just about “opinions” or “images of 
something” or “attitudes towards something” but “theories” or “areas of knowledge” as their own 
entities and with their own legitimacy. With the formation of common everyday theories, abstract 
and unknown things become familiar and communicable.  
More recently the concept of cognitive polyphasia has gained a lot of interest. The idea of cognitive 
polyphasia had already been proposed in 1961 by Moscovici when he defined it as “dynamic 
coexistence – interference and specialization – of distinct modalities of knowledge that correspond 
to definite relationships of man and his environment” (Moscovici, 2008, p. 190). Thus, the concept 
helps us understand knowledge as a plurality of parallel and sometimes contradictory forms of 
thought, meanings, and practices that reside in the same individual, group, or community 
(Jovchelovitch, 2007; Wagner, Duveen, Verma & Themel, 2000) and fulfils a variety of functions 
and responds to different needs of social life (Jovchelovitch, 2008). It means that representations 
may be heterogeneous and contradictory, and under certain circumstances, they can occur at the 
same time and in the same situation (Jovchelovitch, 2007; Provencher, 2011).  
In this line of thought, in a more recent discussion on cognitive polyphasia, Moscovici (Moscovici 
& Markova, 2000) emphasises the role of norms, context and goals in knowledge construction. 
While norms provide limits to what is considered as rational thinking and knowledge in our 
societies, the context guides the way people recognise and process information and goals shape the 
way people use such knowledge (Provencher, 2011). In other words, cognitive polyphasia is an 
asset of human cognition, a tool that enables adjustment to different situations and conditions (e.g., 
Renedo & Jovchelovitch, 2007; Caillaud & Kalampalikis, 2013), the expression of multiple 
identities (Howarth, Wagner, Magnusson & Sammut, 2014; Amer, Howarth & Ragini, 2015) as 
well as the communication between representations in the maintenance or transformation of 
knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 2008).  
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A concept tightly related to the cognitive polyphasia is the one of themata (Vignaux & Moscovici, 
1994), which refers to the centrality of interdependent antinomies, for example, human/nature or 
tradition/modern, and thus, to polyphasia in the process of social representation (Markova, 2003). In 
practice, this means that people draw upon oppositional representations in their construction of 
knowledge (e.g., Renedo & Jovchelovitch, 2007; Wagner et al., 2000). In line with such a 
perspective, it also means that social representational processes are linked to power. Through 
communication and dialogue, some representations gain more success and become self-evident at 
the expense of other representations of more marginalised groups in society (O’Dwyer, Lyons & 
Cohrs, 2016; Howarth, 2006).  
Importantly, thus, in comparison with theories based on the cognitive-developmental paradigm 
presented above, in the social representations theory (SRT) the knowledge about certain objects is 
not considered as a developmental process that transforms from one representation to another; 
instead different forms of knowledge co-exist, contradict and constantly change (Jovchelovitch, 
2007; 2008).  
 
How personal epistemologies and social representations help us understand how people make 
sense of the origin of their species  
People have long been fascinated by their own origins, for which various cultures have offered a 
wide range of explanations during history. Next, we will discuss Finns’ understandings of the origin 
of human beings and what role personal epistemologies and social representations have in these 
understandings. Evolution theory has a strong position in Finland as an explanation of human 
origins. It is taught in schools as part of life sciences. Some of its elements are well rooted in 
people’s minds, as manifested in everyday jokes about the cousins in zoos and in the well-known 
dialogue in Väinö Linna’s (1954/2015) seminal novel Unknown Soldiers, in which soldiers chat, 
reflect and joke about human prehistory and the place of fish in it. The creation story as an 
explanation of the origin of human beings has an even longer history than the theory of evolution. 
Also, it still has a significant place in the worldview of the majority of the population. The creation 
story of human history, however, can be interpreted in quite different ways. For example, Niiniluoto 
(1984) has argued that even educated people at the end of the 19th century could literally rely on the 
creation story as a prehistory of humankind, but today, according to the position prevailing within 
the Lutheran Church, Finland’s majority church, the story of creation must be understood 
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symbolically. However, there is still more variety in the standpoints among the population, as 
becomes evident below.  
At the practical level, science and religion are intertwined in many ways. For example, in Finland, 
the Lutheran priests receive their education in theological faculties, even though the church ordains 
the priests. The inauguration programme for the academic year of the largest university in Finland 
continues to include a worship service. In schools, ethics as an alternative to religion is still an 
exception to the mainstream. Learning outcomes in religion are rated as in any other school subject. 
Many Finns get married and buried according to church ceremonies, and relatives and friends not 
belonging to church customarily participate in these events.   
One dilemma of Kitchener and King dealt with the question of human origins. It was presented to 
Finnish interviewees as a part of a broader project (Pirttilä-Backman, 1993). The dilemma that also 
covers ontological assumptions says:  
“Many religions of the world have creation stories. These stories suggest that a divine 
being created the earth and its people. Scientists claim, however, that people evolved 
from lower animal forms (some of which were similar to apes) into the human forms 
we know today.” (King & Kitchener, 1994, p. 260) 
In Finland, 142 people responded to all four of Kitchener’s and King’s dilemmas (Pirttilä-Backman, 
1993). The respondents represented different educational levels and fields and included both 
students in halfway of their studies and graduates from the same educational institutions ten years 
earlier as well as people with little specialised education.  
The interview protocol for each dilemma received first three scores according to Kitchener’s and 
King's scoring manual3, reflecting the development stages manifested in the interviews (see Table 1 
for the stage descriptions). For example, if during the interview views and justifications reflecting 
only stage 3 were presented, the scorer recorded 333. On the other hand, if the majority of the 
arguments corresponded to stage six, but there were also clear indications of stage 5 and some of 
stage 4, a score of 654 was assigned. Next, an average of each dilemma was calculated for each 
interviewee, after which a personal stage average was formed by calculating the average of all 
dilemmas except the one concerning human origins. The distribution of these personal averages 
based on three dilemmas are shown in Table 2. 
 
10 
 
  TABLE 2 HERE 
Table 2 shows that the most common development stage average was around four, while the next 
typical averages were five and three. The highest stages were rather exceptional. This has been the 
case also in studies conducted in the U.S., with the stage averages varying from 3.6 among high 
school students to 5.3 among doctoral students (King, Kitchener & Wood, 1994).4    
In the dilemma of human pre-history, evolution was chosen by 46% of women, and 65% of men. 
Creation was selected by 20% of women and 12.5% of men, while 13% of women and 12.5% of 
men chose both standpoints. For the rest, 21% of women and 10% of men did not take a stand on 
this dilemma. Although there was some degree of variation in percentages, the difference between 
the genders in the basic standpoints was not statistically significant.  
The interviewees with the highest stage scores had all chosen the theory of evolution. A 
considerable proportion of the interviewees who had low stage scores had also come to this 
solution. Those who had selected evolution had a clearly larger deviation in the mean stage scores 
than other groups. Looking at Group-wise scores, the highest mean stage score (4.7) was in the 
group that had selected both evolution and creation. The mean score for those who had selected 
evolution was 4.3 and for those who had selected creation it was 3.8. The differences in group-wise 
mean stage scores proved statistically significant between those who had selected both standpoints 
and those who had selected creation only; there were no significant differences between the other 
groups. 
Those who chose evolution justified their view by arguing that there is evidence, knowledge and 
proof of evolution. According to the justifications of the statements and their meanings, these 
interviewees could still be divided into two subgroups. In the first of these, the proof of 
evolutionary theory was what was known at the moment, while other topics were hardly taken up. 
This subgroup was categorised as “There is evidence of evolution, but not about the other option”. 
In the second subgroup, “I'm so realistic that I have never believed in the supernatural”, evidence 
and facts were considered to be the sole property of reality and the basis for the solutions, because 
supernatural reality was regarded as non-existent. 
Also those who chose creation as their only standpoint expressed their choice clearly. They could be 
divided into the following four subgroups on the basis of their main justifications: 1) I believe; 2) 
This is what I learnt, and this is how it may be; 3) But where did everything begin from? 4) But we 
are not monkeys.  
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Those who chose both standpoints considered that there is no contradiction between evolution and 
creation. The view was clarified in four different ways that can be summarised as follows: 1) It is 
the same thing expressed in different ways; 2) Both can be true because neither of them can be said 
to be wrong; 3) Evolution is certain but religion also has its place; and 4) Someone created lower 
forms of animals, which then developed into higher animal forms. 
Those who did not take any stand formed the fourth major class. Each interview had been started by 
asking for the standpoint. If the interviewee did not choose either of the options presented, later in 
the interview s/he was asked, inter alia, why the interviewee could not or was not willing to take a 
stand and whether s/he could at some point and on some premises choose a standpoint. Therefore, 
in these interviews, the interviewees presented different views on the origin of human beings. Two 
clear subgroups emerged from this group: 1) This is unknown; and 2) I have not yet solved this for 
myself. For more details of the qualitative analysis and results, see Pirttilä-Backman and Hakanen, 
(1994). 
 
Conclusions:  Social representations and personal epistemologies in making sense of the 
human origin 
In Finland, the evolution theory and the story of creation are both well-known explanations for the 
origin of human beings. They constitute thus a largely shared, common information base that people 
and groups can use when forming and maintaining their own standpoints on the issue. All the 
interviewees had at least heard about both standpoints, but they used them differently to form their 
individual standpoints and came to different solutions. 
Fish and monkeys were in people’s talk the major milestones in the evolution theory. Concrete 
images of the theory of evolution, objectifications, have thus been formed through them. Animals 
were also used as anchors for making the scientific theory more familiar. Relevant to the 
interviewees was also that evolution was a scientific theory; scholarship convinced them, even 
though the scientific details were not necessarily very clear to them.  
The strong position of science in our culture is also reflected in that all the interviewees who had 
received the highest stage ratings had chosen evolution. The highest developmental stages of 
personal epistemologies are in line with the scientific worldview. However, the greatest variation in 
developmental stages was among those who had chosen evolution, which means that some 
members of this group scored very low in developmental stages. One explanation for this - as well 
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as for those who had chosen creation and had low average stage scores - is these interviewees’ 
difficulty in considering multiple viewpoints simultaneously. An interesting single observation in 
the study was that those who chose both evolution and creation were also rated with higher average 
developmental stages. This finding is in line with the hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia discussed 
above (Moscovici, 1961/2008), indicating that contrasting modes of reasoning can be found co-
existing without any tension, even in the same individual. On the contrary, rather than being 
mutually exclusive, conflicting themes can operate as an asset from which people can draw the 
resources to deal with in their social life (Renedo & Jovchelovitch, 2007).  
Even though evolution as a scientific theory provided assurance for many, it also caused resistance. 
To some, accepting evolution would have meant betraying their faith. Creation could be seen as part 
of faith as such, related to the Creator. Religion as such could be seen as bringing safety and 
feelings of togetherness. However, strictness and rigidity and use of power were also connected to 
it. (Pirttilä-Backman & Hakanen, 1994)  
As has been outlined by Moscovici (Moscovici & Markova, 2000), norms provide boundaries for 
what is considered to be knowledge in certain social groups, thus people may rely on models of 
explanation that gain broad social acceptance within their social group despite contradictory 
evidence. Also, in line with the hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici, 1961/2008), 
knowledge is polymorphic and social subjects may use it in a heuristic manner depending on the 
context and their needs. 
There are several “everyday theories” in Finland about the origin of human beings. It is possible 
that those who have chosen creation as their only standpoint are more likely than others to form 
cohesive groups, because they hold a minority standpoint in a society governed by a scientific 
worldview. These people as a group may also have most clearly formulated everyday theory of the 
topic, even though it would not technically correspond the highest stages of personal 
epistemologies. On average, representatives of the other standpoints do not necessarily have an 
equally strong need to discuss their choice. Concerning the simultaneous examination of personal 
epistemologies and social representations, it would be interesting to focus on different communities 
in which one of the key premises in the group formation is the human origin standpoint. 
Even though the connections between personal epistemologies and social representations have not 
yet been studied extensively, as seen above, personal epistemologies are interestingly linked to the 
common everyday theories we construct of different types of new, complex and important issues. 
On the one hand, we are attached to our groups and communities by these everyday theories. They 
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are an important part of our living environments. We can thus ask whether the everyday theories 
facilitate or hinder communication with others and facing complex issues. On the other hand, it is 
equally important to examine if the personal epistemologies of the people support the diverse use of 
cultural information and different explanation models or if they constrain the positions that can be 
formed.  
Further attention is also needed to understand better the interplay between cognitive polyphasia, 
personal epistemologies and wisdom. In their recent study, Manwaring and colleagues (2018) found 
that among religious people in the United States, religiosity was positively associated with 
creationistic views and negatively with acceptance of evolution. However, ability in scientific 
reasoning did not predict acceptance of evolution among these people. Neither was the acceptance 
of evolution indicative of high scientific reasoning ability. As a response to the call by Manwaring 
and colleagues for better understanding the barriers in accepting the evolution theory, the different 
belief systems could be analysed from the perspective of cognitive polyphasia, which provides a 
wide framework to analyse the phenomenon simultaneously at both societal and individual levels. 
More developed epistemic understanding has already been related to wisdom (for recent reviews of 
the concept of wisdom, see Grossmann, 2017; Walsh, 2015). The ability to understand the 
uncertainties related to knowing and the ability to make sound judgements in the face of this 
uncertainty, have been a part of many definitions of wisdom (Kitchener & Brenner, 1990). These 
judgements are related to difficult real-life problems to which there are no clear answers. Haste, 
Markoulis and Helkama (1998) and Murray (2010) have also suggested that one of the aspects of 
wisdom would concern understanding the nature and the boundaries of knowledge. Therefore, 
understanding the development of personal epistemologies can be useful in understanding wisdom - 
in particular Stages 4 to 7 in Kitchener’s and King’s model, because they all involve the 
acknowledgement of the uncertainty of knowing (Kitchener & Brenner, 1990). However, the 
elements that can be used to characterise wisdom are not present until Stage 7: the ability to 
integrate opposing views and to make reasoned judgements while recognising the limitations and 
uncertainties present in all knowing, including one’s personal limits (Kitchener & Brenner, 1990).  
The analysis presented in this chapter of the relationship between personal epistemologies and 
social representations has provided new insights to understanding people’s thinking about human 
origins. In a similar way, future research on the relationship between cognitive polyphasia and 
wisdom may bring new insights to both fields. 
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Table 1. King’s and Kitchener’s (e.g. 1994) developmental model of personal epistemologies.  
 
Stage Assumptions of 
knowledge 
Justifications  
1 Absolute equivalence exists between 
what is seen and what is: what I see is 
true. 
Because knowing is just seeing, 
justifications are not needed.  
 
2 There is right and wrong knowledge -
and somebody always knows the truth. 
Uncertainty does not exist.  
Facts can be known by one’s own 
observation. If they cannot be directly 
known, one can appeal to the 
authorities.  
 
3 Not even authorities always know the 
truth, but uncertain claims are temporary 
– the absolute truth can be found.  
  
 
In uncertain matters beliefs can be 
justified by what feels right or what 
one wants to believe.  
4 Knowledge per se is uncertain and 
idiosyncratic. So, uncertainty is a 
permanent and acceptable condition.  
  
The reasons for uncertainty are 
concrete. Beliefs and feelings can be 
used as justifications.  
 
  
5 Knowledge is always contextual, and 
beliefs can be justified only in a 
particular context, as things are 
The justifications of beliefs can be 
evaluated only within one context. 
However, the arguments can still be 
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interpreted differently in different 
frameworks. 
 
evaluated by looking at the relative 
merit of their various components. 
 
6 Despite the contextuality of knowledge, 
some beliefs can be regarded as being 
better than others. This is based on the 
ability to make comparisons between 
reference frames. Research is a process 
that results in changes in knowledge.  
 
Different beliefs can be compared with 
each other justifiably. 
 
7 Knowledge is a result of critical 
combination and evaluation of 
standpoints and evidence. Some 
estimates, interpretations and solutions 
can therefore be more justified than 
others. However, the current knowledge 
will be re-evaluated later. This means 
that with time, current knowledge will 
most probably change into newer 
versions. 
 
 
Evaluation and comparison are 
continuing processes in which new 
viewpoints can come up. Also, new 
criteria can be brought into 
consideration.  
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Table 2. The distribution of interviewees’ personal stage averages of three dilemmas (N = 142; 
source: Pirttilä-Backman & Hakanen, 1994). 
  
Stage mean of 
three dilemmas 
Percentage of 
respondents 
less than 3.49 22.5% 
3.5–4.49 41.5% 
4.5–5.49 23.9% 
5.5–6.49 9.2% 
6.5–7 2.8% 
 
 
